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II] THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

rise N

970232-CA

-vGASPER BORGOGNO,
Priority No.

2_

Defendant/Appellant

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF

PR0CEEDINGS

This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated, § 78-2a3(2) (f) (1992 as amended), whereby a defendant in i district
court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals
from a final order for anything other than a first-degree or
capital felony.

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the nature of the prosecutor's discovery

response constituted a violation of the defendant/appellant's
due-process rights, where the prosecution made a Response to
Motion for Discovery (no motion for discovery having been made, a
response having been submitted pursuant to an "open-file"
policy), containing blanket language concerning the potential
availability of either aural or visual evidence, together with

the submission to defense counsel of a police report referencing
the manufacturing of an audio tape from the confidential
informant's wire and the tape having been submitted for
transcription, as the defendant/appellant's due-process rights
have been established under Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, and whether such violation constitutes reversible
error pursuant to the Utah Constitution, Article I, § 7, and §
77-1-6, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended).

Claims regarding

prosecutory failure to produce exculpatory and/or inculpatory
evidence are examined under a standard of law as set forth under
Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, together with the
facts of the case, and whether the error is harmful {State
Archuleta,

v.

850 P.2d 1232, 1241 (Utah 1993)) or whether absent the

error there is a reasonable likelihood of an outcome more
favorable to the defendant {State
(Utah Ct.

App.
2.

v.

White,

880 P.2d 18, 21

1994)).

Whether defense counsel's failure to make a formal

discovery request in order to acquire the tape recording (and/or
a transcript thereof) made pursuant to the wiring of the
confidential informant, and to follow up with a motion to compel
the production of the recording and transcript, constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel, pursuant to the Sixth
2

Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Utah
Constitution, Article I, § 7.

Claims of ineffectiveness of

counsel are reviewed under a standard of a reasonable probability
that except for ineffective counsel, the result of the trial
court would have been different.
U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct.
denied,
State

Verde,
3.

v.

Washington,

2052, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674,

467 U.S. 1267, 104 S.Ct.
v.

Strickland

466

reh'g

3562, 82 L.Ed.2s 864 (1984);

770 P.2d 116, 118-119 (Utah 1989).
Whether defense counsel's failure to listen to the

tape recording or acquire a transcript of the tape recording
and/or a copy of the tape recording itself, made pursuant to the
wiring of the confidential informant, constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel, pursuant to the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution, Article I,
§ 7.

Claims of ineffectiveness of counsel are reviewed under a

standard of a reasonable probability that except for ineffective
counsel, the result of the trial court would have been different.
Strickland

v.

Washington,

2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, reh'g

466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct.
denied,

467 U.S. 1267, 104 S. Ct.

3562, 82 L.Ed.2s 864 (1984); State v.
119 (Utah 1989) .

3

2052,

Verde,

770 P.2d 116, 118-

4.

Whether defense counsel's failure to request voir

dire regarding extensive pretrial publicity concerning a
methamphetamine laboratory found in Stockton, Utah, which caused
the evacuation of the town, and to which defendant was linked,
impeded defendant's right to an impartial jury and constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel, pursuant to the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Utah
Constitution, Article I, § § 7 and 10.

Claims of ineffectiveness

of counsel are reviewed under a standard of a reasonable
probability that except for ineffective counsel, the result of
Strickland

the trial court would have been different.
Washington,
674, reh'g

466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct.
denied,

(1984); State

v.

2052, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d

467 U.S. 1267, 104 S.Ct.
Verde,

v.

3562, 82 L.Ed.2s 864

770 P.2d 116, 118-119 (Utah 1989).

CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
United States Constitution
Amendment VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
4

favor, and to have the Assistance of counsel for his
defence.
Amendment XIV
1. [Citizenship - Due process of law - Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens
of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Utah Constitution
Article I, § 7
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.
Article I, § 10
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall
remain inviolate. In capital cases the jury shall
consist of twelve persons, and in all other felony
cases, the jury shall consist of no fewer than eight
persons. In other cases, the Legislature shall
establish the number of jurors by statute, but in no
event shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons.
In criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In
civil cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a
verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless
demanded.

5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with arranging for distribution
of a controlled substance, a third-degree felony, in violation of
§ 58-37-8(1) (a) (ii), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) .
(R. 4-5).
At the arraignment August 26, 1996, defendant pled not
guilty to the charge.

In a jury trial held on January 21 and 24,

1997, the defendant was found guilty as charged.

(R.

17-18) .

Defendant was sentenced on March 10, 1997, and was committed to
the Tooele County Detention Center (R.

52-53) .

A Notice of Appeal was filed on April 9, 1997 (R. 59),
which has brought this matter before this Court.

An order was

entered on September 23, 1997, appointing new counsel to
represent the defendant in the appellate process.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The defendant/appellant is a 54-year-old male who, on
or about August 13, 1996, was charged in District Court with one
count of arranging for distribution of a controlled substance (a
third-degree felony).

The charge arose after a confidential

informant, Joseph Grimaud (hereinafter "Grimaud"), acting upon
the suggestion of his attorney, contacted the Tooele City Police

6

Department with an offer to "help out" with the Department's drug
investigations in return for recommendations for reduced time in
his sentencing.

Grimaud was wired by the police officers and led

them to the automotive shop owned by the Defendant, where Grimaud
asked the defendant if he had "a teener."

Defense and

prosecution witnesses differ as to the exact words that were
spoken thereafter, but Grimaud received methamphetamine from a
third person present in the shop, with the consequence that the
defendant was charged with arranging for distribution of a
controlled substance.
Defendant's trial counsel, Scott A.

Broadhead,

evidently did not make a formal request for discovery, as none
appears in the court record; however, the prosecutor filed a
Response to Motion for Discovery, on September 3, 1996 (Index of
Record on Appeal).

The police record (dated May 29, 1996)

provided by the prosecution to the defense indicated that the
tape recording produced by the wiring of the confidential
informant, Grimaud, had been turned in for transcribing.

The

prosecution did not provide a copy of the tape transcription, nor
of the tape itself, to the defense in its response to motion for
discovery.

(R. 8 ) .

7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
First, the prosecution had an absolute duty to provide
all evidence which was or might be exculpatory to the defendant,
whether or not a discovery request was made by the defendant.
The prosecution had a correlating duty (under Rule 16(a) (5) of
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure) to provide all inculpatory
evidence to the defense, when voluntary disclosure of evidence
has been made.

The prosecution had a police officer and the

confidential informant who testified as to the defendant's words
at the time of the drug buy by the confidential informant,
Grimaud; these witnesses differed in their versions of the
events.

The defense also had one witness who testified about

selling the illegal substance to the confidential informant; his
version was closer to the police officer's and differed
substantially from that of Grimaud. The tape of the night's
proceedings would provide uncontrovertible evidence as to the
words spoken, and whether a drawer was opened (as claimed by the
confidential informant) to retrieve baggies for dividing a
portion of the drug for Grimaud.

Since it was not used by the

prosecution at the trial of the matter, the inference by a
reasonable onlooker is that the tape did not verify the story
presented by the prosecution's witness, and was exculpatory.
8

The

police report detailed the wiring of the confidential informant,
the taping of the transmission from the wire, and the turning in
of the tape for transcription.

It was plain error for the

prosecution to withhold the tape and the transcription from the
defense.
Secondly, defendant was entitled to the effective
assistance of counsel at his trial.

Counsel had an obligation to

obtain all the evidence available to him, particularly that which
might benefit his client.

Counsel had only to read the police

record to be made aware of the existence of the tape.

A casual

perusal of the prosecution's Response to Motion for Discovery
reveals that neither the tape nor a transcription thereof was
specifically mentioned.

A caveat pertaining to untranscribed

tapes was clearly set forth in the Response.

Counsel had an

obligation to make a formal request for production of all
inculpatory and exculpatory materials, and to investigate all
available evidence as to its inculpatory or exculpatory value.
Counsel had an obligation to make an appointment to listen to the
tape, or to make a motion to compel the production of the tape
and/or the transcript.

Failure to fulfill either of these

obligations constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel,
particularly since the probability is more than reasonable that
9

the outcome of the trial would have been different had the
defendant's version of events been verified by the contents of
the tape.
Thirdly, defendant should have been given the
opportunity to examine the veniremen concerning their exposure to
the pre-trial publicity concerning the alleged existence of a
"drug lab" in a building owned by him and an explosion and fire
associated with the drug lab, with which he was linked by the
police investigators, and which received extensive press coverage
in the Tooele County newspapers.

The failure of defense counsel

to request voir dire on this subject, and to formally object to
the lack of its inclusion in the actual voir dire used by the
court, comprised ineffective assistance of counsel.

Reasonable

probability exists that the makeup of the empaneled jury would
have been different had such questions been asked, so that the
outcome of the trial was affected.

10

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE NATURE OF THE PROSECUTOR'S DISCOVERY RESPONSE DID
NOT FURNISH EVIDENCE TO WHICH THE DEFENDANT WAS
ENTITLED, AND VIOLATED DEFENDANT'S DUE-PROCESS RIGHTS,
SO THAT THE VERDICT SHOULD BE OVERTURNED
The defense in this matter made no formal motion for
discovery1; nevertheless, the prosecutor offered a response to
motion for discovery under his "open-file" policy, which
contained the following statements:
1.
The attached documents represent all discoverable,
non-privileged, reports and witness statements, if any, in
the possession of the County Attorney as of the date of the
date (sic) of this response. Other documents, notes,
statements, and related materials may exist in individual
police agency files. You are directed to contact these
agencies for such information. The prosecution does
specifically deny any request for police officer notebook
entries, officers' field notes, or documents of any and
every kind and description in possession of or known to any
police investigative agency, prosecuting agency, or
department.
3.
Unless exculpatory evidence or evidence which
tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt
of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense for
reduced punishment(,) is set forth in the attached
documents, the same is unknown to the prosecutor, and the
prosecutor herewith denies the request for production of the
same.

Appellate counsel has confirmed with Alan K. Jeppesen,
Deputy Tooele County Attorney, that trial counsel made no formal
request for discovery; however, Mr. Jeppesen produced a formal
"Response to Motion for Discovery."
11

5.
Recorded reports or evidence in aural or visual
form, which has not been transcribed at the time of this
response [,] may be viewed at the office of the prosecutor or
such other place as he may designate upon an appointment
being arranged between the prosecutor and the defendant's
counsel.
(R.

6-7).

The response also contained the police report of Officer Roger
Niesporek, wherein the officer described how a confidential
informant was "wired" and the sounds picked up by the wire were
transmitted to a receiver in the officer's vehicle, where they
were recorded.2

The prosecutor's response did not specify the

audiotape with specificity as not being produced.

Simply saying

to the defense, "Come look at it," wasn't good enough.

Saying,

"I'm not going to get it for you," isn't an adequate response
under the standards established by the case law of our
jurisdiction.

The nature of the prosecutor's response was

insufficient.

2

Appellate counsel has made inquiry into the location and
contents of the audiotape, in an attempt to become familiar with
the nature of its contents. The evidence custodian for Tooele
County does not now know where the audiotape is. No transcript
of the tape ever came into the possession of the Tooele County
Attorney's office, according to Deputy County Attorney Alan K.
Jeppesen.
12

A.

The prosecution had an absolute responsibility to
produce the tape recording to the defense.
The appellate courts of the State of Utah have, in

criminal prosecutions, established two independent obligations
for the provision of evidence to a defendant:
(1) The due-process duty to provide, without request by
the defendant, all exculpatory evidence (This was declared in the
case of State

v.

Worthen,

765 P.2d 839, 849 (Utah 1988), wherein

the Utah Supreme Court set forth the requirement that the State
must disclose even unrequested information which is or may
exculpatory.

Again, in State

v.

Kail in,

be

877 P.2d 138 (Utah

1994), that Court reaffirmed the State's duty "under the Due
Process of Clause of the United States Constitution to provide,
without request by the defendant, all exculpatory evidence."
Worthen,

at 850; State

v.

Carter,

707 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah

1985) .)
(2) The duty to provide inculpatory evidence, when
required by court order, pursuant to Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure.

In Kail in,

the Court noted the practice in

this state in some districts for prosecutors to make all
inculpatory evidence available to the defense on request, and in
State

v.

Knight,

734 P.2d 913, 916

13

(Utah 1987), the Court

emphasized that it is a prosecutor's duty to comply fully and
forthrightly with such a request.

Knight

also established the

principle that when the prosecution makes a voluntary disclosure
of inculpatory evidence to a defendant, it must produce all the
requested material or identify those portions not disclosed.
In the instant case, the Tooele County prosecutor's
office maintained an "open-file" policy; that is, discovery was
provided to the defense even though no formal discovery request
was made.

Under that policy, the prosecutor's duty to furnish

the confidential informant audiotape to the defense was absolute:
if the tape were exculpatory, it had to be produced under the
first Kail in

requirement; if it were inculpatory, it had to be

produced under the prosecution's duty to make a correct and
complete disclosure, or it had to be identified as a portion of
evidence not disclosed.

Knight

at 916.

The prosecutor's

voluntarily-produced Response to Motion for Discovery created an
"unconditional agreement to produce statements" in the possession
of any group or aency involved in the investigation or
prosecution of the case.

He was therefore obliged to "search

beyond his own file cabinet" to determine whether there were
additional materials that should be provided to the defense.
Knight

at 918.
14

To simply state, as did the prosecutor in the instant
case, "Recorded . . . evidence in aural . . . form, which has not
been transcribed at the time of this response [,] may be viewed at
the office of the prosecutor . . ." was not adequate to identify
the audiotape of the confidential informant as either an item
being produced or an item being withheld.

If the prosecution

argues that the tape was too garbled to be intelligible, it still
should have been furnished to the defendant for his use in
determining whether the quality of the recording could be
enhanced.

B.

The prosecutor's failure to produce the audiotape or
transcript negatively impacted the defense.
The failure of the State to provide this evidence

impaired the Defendant's ability to defend himself.

Courts have

generally refused to conclude that evidence is overwhelming in
cases that ultimately rest on a jury's resolution of conflicting
evidence, and have held that prosecutorial error (such as
improper "Doyle" statements in closing argument) are not harmless
where a trial come down to a "credibility judgment."
Byrd,

937 P.2d 532 (Utah Ct.

App.

1997), quoting White

State,

647 N.E.2d 684, 688 (Ind.

State,

102 Nev. 316, 721 P.2d 379, 383 (Nev. 1986) .
15

State

Ct.

App.

v.

v.

1995) and Aesoph

v.

In this case there were three primary witnesses:

a

police officer, the confidential informant, and the actual seller
of the drugs to the confidential informant.

The police officer

listened to the proceedings via a receiving device in his
vehicle, which picked up the transmission from the "wire"
emplaced upon the body of the confidential informant.

The

officer (Officer Roger Niesporek) testified that he could hear
the following:
Q

And did you then hear the C.I., Mr. Girmaud, say
something?

A

Yes.

Q

And did you hear a response to that request?

A

Yes I did.

Q

And did you recognize the voice of the person who
responded?

A

Yes I could.

Q

And what did you hear?

A

He said, U I wish I did."

Q

And could you tell who said that?

A

That was Butch Begonia (sic).

Q

And then what happened?

He asked Butch if he had a teener.

16

A

(P.

Then Butch turned to someone else and asked if he had
any, and this person said, "Yes, I do."

65, R.

132). Officer Niesporek testified that he heard the

conversation, but that he didn't make any notes concerning it
until he wrote his report after returning to the station.
A secondary witness, Officer Steve Swartzfager,
testified that he had bits and pieces, that didn't "fit into
place"

(p. 77, R.

144), because the transmission was breaking

up at his location.
The second primary prosecution witness was the
confidential informant, who identified himself for the record as
"Joseph Riley Girmaud" but who, according to the court's
transcriptionist, spelled his name, "G-R-I-M-A-U-D."

(We will

use his name as he spelled it, "Grimaud.") Grimaud testified:

A

Then he came over to me and I asked him again if he had
anything and he said, "No, but someone probably does."

Q

What did he ask Jack?

A

He asked Jack if he had any, and he said, "Yeah, I do."

Q

And then Jack pulled it out?

A

Yes.

Q

And then what did you do?
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I handed him the $100.00 and Butch slid the bag that I
see in front of me, over to me.
From Jack?
Yes.
-6, R.

172-3).

And he slid it over to you and you gave Jack the money?
I just set it on the desk.
, R.

173).

Under cross examination, Mr. Grimaud further testified:
I thought you just told me that when you went to buy,
Jack pulled out the baggy and put it on the table. Is
that correct?
No sir.
Okay, then what did he do?
Jack Henwood had a plastic bag; a clear plastic baggy
with him. He took it out. He pulled open his desk
drawer there at Butch7s shop, and pulled out this
yellow baggy, dumped it in there, set in on the table.
That's when I put down my $100.00.
So Jack went and took a baggy from Butch's desk drawer?
No, Butch grabbed the baggy for Jack and put it in.
You just said just a second ago that he opened the
drawer, and he grabbed the baggy out of the drawer.
That is what you just said.
We was all sitting around the table. Butch grabbed
open his drawer, handed him the yellow baggy to Jack
18

Henwood, Jack Henwood then toad (sic) some of his bag,
put in that bag. Because he had more than a teener on
him.
(P.

109, R.

176).

The testimony of the confidential informant was a
surprise to both the prosecution and the defense.

After a

counsel in the judge's chambers, the actual seller of the drugs
to the confidential informant (Jack Henwood) was called by the
defense to contradict Mr. Grimaud's testimony, although he had
not previously been identified as a defense witness.

The State

objected to Mr. Henwood as a witness, particularly since
Mr. Grimaud had been released by both participants, but the
defense argued that it needed Mr. Henwood to rebut Mr. Grimaud's
surprise testimony.

After commenting that the testimony probably

should not have been a surprise, the Court allowed Mr. Henwood to
testify, and, in addition, allowed the State a continuance of the
trial in order to contact and recall Mr. Grimaud in rebuttal to
Mr. Henwood.
Mr. Henwood testified:
Q

Did you see Joe approach Butch?

A

Yes I did.

Q

Do you remember what he said?

A

He asked Butch if he had a teener.
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Q

And what did Butch say?

A

He said "No." I don't think (inaudible) said anything.
He looked over at me and I said, "I've got one."

Q

Okay, and where was everyone standing at this time?

A

I think Butch was by his desk, Joe was sitting on a
chair by some parts bins, and I was standing in the
middle of the shop.

Q

Okay, when you said that you had some, what did you do?

A

I think Joe - he asked for a teener. I pulled it out
and went over and threw it over on the desk I think, if
I remember right, and said it was a bill. he asked how
much and I said, "A bill."

Q

Okay, and what was Butch doing at this time?

A

Sitting at his desk.

Q

Okay, did he touch this envelope?

A

The plastic bag?

Q

The plastic bag - the baggy?

A
Q

I threw it on the desk.
At any time did you see Butch pull open the desk
drawer?

A

No, I don't think so.

Q

When you gave the baggy to Joe, was - did you already
have it in a little baggy, or did you pour some?

A

Yes.

Q

So he didn't pour any into any?

A

I don't think so.

He just kind of looked at me.

I already had the baggy.

I don't remember.
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(P.

Q

Okay. And just so I understand. What was the
conversation again when Joe came up to Butch and said,
u
Do you have a teener?" What did Butch say?

A

He said, "No." He said, "I wished I did," or something
like that. He said, U I wish I did.

Q

And then what did Butch say?

A

I don't think he said anything. I think he looked over
at me and I said, "I've got one." I'm not sure if he
asked me or - I don't think he did. I think he looked
over because I was waiting to see if I could sell him
some, when I got there. I think he was busy and I
didn't know this guy that asked.

Q

So to your knowledge, did Butch ever touch the baggy or
the one-hundred dollar bill?

A

I don't think so. I know I threw - I knew I threw the
baggy on the desk. I remember that, because I had like
three of them - three or four of them and I went
through and I tossed it down on the desk.

Q

When you were later - when you were arrested, what
drugs did you have on you at that time?

A

I had, I think, two teeners and two 1/4 grams - two.

Q

Okay, did you have any loose baggies on you?

A

Yes.

132., R.

I had a lot of loose baggies.
199) .

Officer Niesporek was called for recross examination,
and testified:
Q

He stated that he had told you before that all there
parties were sitting around the table, and he told you
that. Do you remember him saying that to you?
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(P.

A

We had a brief conversation at the City Shops when he
gave me the (inaudible); . . . I don't specifically
recall him saying that Butch had handed it to him on
that transaction.

Q

Okay, because if he did tell you that you probably
would have written it down in your report?

A

I believe I would have.

Q

And this information is not in your police report,
correct?

A

It is not.

Q

So any information about Butch, and him getting baggies
out of a drawer, or handing the baggies to Jack, or
pushing the bag of methamphetamine over to Mr. Girmaud,
you never heard that before?

A

I don't recall that, no.

Q

And it*'s not in your police report.

A

No it's not.

145, R. 212-213).
Officer Niesporek also testified that Mr. Henwood told

him that he had poured the stuff into a baggy before he ever
reached Butch's shop.

(P.

145, R.

214).

Mr. Henwood's testimony matched Officer Niesporek's
quite closely, pertaining to Mr. Borgogno's words and the
handling of the baggy given to Mr. Grimaud.
verified these words.

The tape would have

It is possible that the noise of a drawer

being opened would also carry on the tape, but Mr. Henwood
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testified that he did not open a desk drawer, and Officer
Niesporek did not mention hearing such a sound.
In the very recent case of State
(Utah Ct.

App.

v.

Byrd,

937 P.2d 532

1997), a police officer testified that he saw,

via long-distance surveillance, the passenger in the front seat
of a vehicle appear to have accepted an item resembling drugs and
to have handed money to the seller.

The officer also testified

that he could not see the driver or the backseat passenger.

The

defendant admitted that he was the frontseat passenger, but
denied that he had accepted drugs or passed money to the seller.
He testified that the driver and backseat passenger bought the
drugs.

Neither the State nor the defendant offered corroborating

evidence to support either version of these events, and thus the
case came down to a "one-on-one situation, i.e., the word of the
defendant against the word of the key prosecution witness."
Similarly, no corroborating evidence was offered in the
instant case, other than the fact that Mr. Henwood was arrested
while in possession of three yellow baggies containing an illegal
substance, and several loose baggies.

Thus, the jury had to

resolve several points of conflicting testimony in order to find
the defendant guilty.

The Byrd

court held that the prosecutor's

constitutional error (comments to the jury that were held to be
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prejudicial) was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and
reversed and remanded the case for a new trial.
Here, there is a very strong likelihood that the tape
not physically produced by the prosecution would have
corroborated the police officer's statements, and thus Mr.
Henwood's statements, so that the outcome of the trial would have
been different.

Consistent with the arguments made above,

together with the analysis in State
Byrd,

v.

Knight

and State

v.

this Court should find that the prosecutor committed plain

error in not producing the tape and/or transcript, which was
prejudicial and harmful to the defendant's ability to defend
himself.

POINT II
FAILURE BY DEFENSE COUNSEL TO MAKE A FORMAL DISCOVERY
REQUEST, AND TO FOLLOW UP WITH A MOTION TO COMPEL THE
PRODUCTION OF THE TAPE AND/OR TRANSCRIPT, CONSTITUTES
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Although being raised for the first time on appeal,
this issue is properly before this Court because:

(1) the record

below is adequate, there being a transcript of the trial and a
record of all pre-trial proceedings, and (2) the defendant is no
longer represented by trial counsel.
P.2d 1027 (Utah 1991); State

v.

State

Garrett,
24

v.

Humphries,

818

849 P.2d 578 (Utah Ct.

1993); State v.

App.

Cosey,

818 P.2d 1027 (Utah 1991).

Having

met these preconditions, the defendant/appellant is entitled to
review of his claims concerning the ineffective assistance of his
trial counsel.
A defendant who raises a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel must show both that his or her counsel
rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner and
that a reasonable probability exists that except for ineffective
counsel, the result would have been different.
770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989) (citing State
913 (Utah 1988)).

v.

Lovell,

State

v.

Verde,

758 P.2d 909,

A reasonable probability is defined as u a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."
Strickland

v.

Washington,

2068 (1984), reh'g

466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct.

denied,

467 U.S. 1267 (1984).

2052,

The appellate

courts of Utah have reaffirmed their commitment to these
standards for effective assistance of counsel in State
Crestani,

op.

711 P.2d 1085 (Utah Ct.

cit., reh'g

Ct. App.

denied;

1993); State

State
v.

v.

App.

Garrett,

Humphries,

op.

1989); State

v.
v.

Verde,

849 P.2d 578 (Utah
cit.

Further, in order to prevail in a claim that trial
counsel demonstrated a deficient performance, defendant must
overcome the strong presumption that his counsel's actions were
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conscious trial strategy, and that there was a lack of any
conceivable tactical basis for his counsel's actions.

In the

instant case, trial counsel had an obligation to prepare fully
for trial, which makes it incumbent upon him to read the police
reports provided to him by the prosecution.

The report of

Officer Roger Niesporek (included herewith as Appendix

XX

A" and

incorporated herein by this reference) described the "wiring" of
the confidential informant, his listening to the transmission
from the wire from inside his police vehicle, and after returning
to the police station, turning in the tape u to Pat Martin for
transcription."

It is inconceivable that trial counsel could

have read this report without being made aware of the existence
of the tape and, presumably, a transcription thereof.
The transcript of the trial is even more convincing
that there was not a conscious strategy with regard to the tape.
Therein, a record is made of the defendant/appellant himself
asking the court, during a recess in chambers:
Mr. Borgogno: "Your Honor, I've got just one question.
Do I have the right to listen to the tape where I supposedly

The Court: You should talk that over with your
attorney(,) Mr. Borgogno, not with me, okay?
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(P. 103, R.

170).

It is clear from this exchange that the

defendant himself was certain that the tape, the existence of
which was attested by both Officer Niesporek and Mr. Grimaud,
could not show anything other than what he knew to have been
actually spoken on the night of the drug buy.

Still, the record

of the court's proceedings is silent concerning any motion,
whether pretrial or in limine, for production of the tape or for
continuance of the trial to allow production of the tape.
Later, trial counsel asked Mr. Grimaud about the tape:

(P.

Q

Did you write any records down?

A

No sir.

Q

Okay. And your conversation was taped, is that
correct?

A

Yes.

Q

Okay. And as far as your knowledge goes, who has the
tape of this conversation?

A

I have no idea.

Q

Okay. . . .

107-8, R.

174-5).

aware of the tape.

Here, counsel makes it clear that he is

It did not matter whether the contents of the

tape were exculpatory or inculpatory.

The prosecution had a duty

to make a correct and complete disclosure of evidence, including
this tape, but defense counsel also had an affirmative duty to
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make a reasonable investigation.

Kallin,

at 143.

The above-

cited question to Mr. Grimaud is the only reference in the entire
record to any investigation of the tape by defense counsel.

In

its context, it does not present any idea that counsel had a
trial strategy that precluded the use of the tape.

By making the

jury again aware of the tape, but failing to point out that the
prosecution had not submitted the tape for them (or him) to hear,
there does not appear to be any point at all in his question to
Mr. Grimaud.
The second prong of the Strickland

test, that there

must be reasonable probability that counsel's deficient
performance prejudiced the outcome of the trial, is met in the
same manner as set forth in Point I above.

The witnesses

conflicted in their testimony, so that the jury was left to
determine between the greater credibility of two persons.

The

prosecutor's closing argument virtually ignored the testimony of
Officer Niesporek, which tended to lend credence to the
statements of the defense witness.

Had the tape been introduced

to provide an incontrovertible testimony, the jury would have
been placed in the position of making a decision based upon
evidence, rather than personality.
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The probability is more than

reasonable, therefore, that the verdict would have been
different.
Since defendant/appellant had a constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel, and did not receive that
benefit, the verdict should be overturned.

POINT III
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO LISTEN TO THE TAPE
RECORDING, OR ACQUIRE A TRANSCRIPT OF THE TAPE AND/OR A
COPY OF THE RECORDING ITSELF, CONSTITUTES INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Again, as stated in Point II above, although being
raised for the first time on appeal this issue is properly before
this Court because:

(1) the record below is adequate, there

being a transcript of the trial and a record of all pre-trial
proceedings, and (2) the defendant is no longer represented by
trial counsel.
State
Cosey,

v.

Garrett,

State

v.

Humphries,

818 P.2d 1027 (Utah 1991);

849 P.2d 578 (Utah App.

818 P.2d 1027 (Utah 1991).

1993); State

v.

Having met these

preconditions, the defendant/appellant is entitled to review of
his claims concerning the ineffective assistance of his trial
counsel.
A defendant who raises a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel must show both that his or her counsel
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rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner and
that a reasonable probability exists that except for ineffective
counsel, the result would have been different.
770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989) (citing State
913 (Utah 1988)).

v.

Lovell,

State

v.

Verde,

758 P.2d 909,

A reasonable probability is defined as "a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."
Strickland

v.

Washington,

2068 (1984), reh'g

denied,

466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct.
467 U.S. 1267 (1984).

2052,

The appellate

courts of Utah have reaffirmed their commitment to these
standards for effective assistance of counsel in State
Crestani,

op.

cit.,

Ct. App.

771 P.2d 1085 (Utah Ct.

reh'g

denied;

1993); State

State
v.

v.

Humphries,

App.

Garrett,
op.

1989); State

v.
v.

Verde,

849 P.2d 578 (Utah
cit.

Further, in order to prevail in a claim that trial
counsel demonstrated a deficient performance, defendant must
overcome the strong presumption that his counsel's actions were
conscious trial strategy, and that there was a lack of any
conceivable tactical basis for his counsel's actions.
Defense counsel was given a copy of Officer Niesporek's
report about his contact with, and wiring of, Mr. Grimaud.
knew that a tape was made from the wire transmission.
received notice from the prosecutor that:
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He

He

3.
Unless exculpatory evidence or evidence which
tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt
of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense for
reduced punishment(,) is set forth in the attached
documents, the same is unknown to the prosecutor, and the
prosecutor herewith denies the request for production of the
same.
(R.

6-7).

Since the prosecutor also was in possession of the

police report, defense counsel should have gone through the
natural thought process:

"They have a tape of the conversation

between the C.I. and the defendant.

They haven't produced it.

The prosecutor says he has provided all exculpatory or mitigating
evidence that he knows about.

Therefore the tape must be

damning, they'll use it at trial, and I better get a copy of it
to see how bad it is and how to handle the damage."

However,

even though the Response to Motion for Discovery was dated more
than three months after the date on which Officer Niesporek
turned in the tape for transcription, the prosecutor had also
given notice that:
5.
Recorded reports or evidence in aural or visual
form, which has not been transcribed at the time of this
response [,] may be viewed at the office of the prosecutor or
such other place as he may designate upon an appointment
being arranged between the prosecutor and the defendant's
counsel.
(R.

6-7).

This statement presented the possibility that the

tape was not inculpatory, but was instead exculpatory, and opened
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up the further possibility that the prosecutor was attempting to
avoid the burden of providing exculpatory evidence by not
acquiring a transcription, and thereby placing the burden upon
the defense to listen to the tape.

With no evidence to present

in his client's behalf, relying only upon his client's
protestations of innocence and a belief that the testimony of the
confidential informant would at best prove ambiguous as to
whether his client had "arranged" a sale of illegal substances,
defense counsel owed his client the duty of investigating every
possibility:

he should have gone in and listened to the tape; he

should have requested a copy of the tape; he should have acquired
a transcript of the tape.

That he did none of these points to a

failure on his part to give the effective assistance to which his
client was entitled.
As in Point II, the second prong of the

Strickland

test, that there must be reasonable probability that counsel's
deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of the trial, is met
in the same manner as set forth in Point I above.

The witnesses

conflicted in their testimony, so that the jury was left to
determine between the greater credibility of two persons.

The

prosecutor's closing argument virtually ignored the testimony of
Officer Niesporek, which lent credence to the statements of the
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defense witness.

Had the tape been introduced to provide

testimony that was not subject to the fallible memory of the
participants, the jury would have been placed in the position of
making a decision based upon evidence, rather than presentation
and appearance.

The probability is more than reasonable,

therefore, that their verdict would have been different.
Additionally, there is no evidence in the record that
counsel's failure to listen to the tape, or read a transcript of
it, was a conscious decision and part of his trial strategy.

We

have already cited the trial transcript wherein the defendant
asked the trial court if he could have the opportunity of
listening to the tape.

The manner of his question ("Your Honor,

I've got just one question.

Do I have the right to listen to the

tape where I supposedly --") makes it clear that his only
knowledge of the contents of the tape was derived as a
participant in the events; he knew what the tape should say
because he was present when it was made; his counsel had not told
him what the tape contained and his counsel had not discussed
with him any existing reasons for not using the tape himself.
Indeed, counsel's immediately subsequent question to Mr. Grimaud
("And as far as your knowledge goes, who has the tape of this
conversation?") raises the speculation that counsel was just
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beginning to realize that the tape could be important to his
client's interests.

No tactical basis appears evident.

Since defendant/appellant had a constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel, and did not receive that
benefit, the verdict should be overturned.

POINT IV
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO REQUEST VOIR DIRE
REGARDING PRETRIAL PUBLICITY SURROUNDING DRUG ACTIVITY
IN STOCKTON, UTAH, AND ALLEGING THE DEFENDANT'S LINKS
THERETO, IMPEDED DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL JURY
AND CONSTITUTES INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
As set forth in Points II and III above, although being
raised for the first time on appeal, this issue is properly
before this Court because:

(1) the record below is adequate,

there being a transcript of the trial and a record of all pretrial proceedings, and (2) the defendant is no longer represented
by trial counsel.
1991); State
v.

Cosey,

v.

State
Garrett,

v.

Humphries,

818 P.2d 1027 (Utah

849 P.2d 578 (Utah App.

818 P.2d 1027 (Utah 1991).

1993);

State

Having met these

preconditions, the defendant/appellant is entitled to review of
his claims concerning the ineffective assistance of his trial
counsel.
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A defendant who raises a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel must show both that his or her counsel
rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner and
that a reasonable probability exists that except for ineffective
counsel, the result would have been different.
770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989) (citing State
913 (Utah 1988)).

v.

Lovell,

State

v.

Verde,

758 P.2d 909,

A reasonable probability is defined as "a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."
Strickland

v.

Washington,

2068 (1984), reh'g

466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct.

denied,

467 U.S. 1267 (1984).

2052,

The appellate

courts of Utah have reaffirmed their commitment to these
standards for effective assistance of counsel in State
Crestani,

op.

cit.,

Ct. App.

111 P.2d 1085 (Utah Ct.

reh'g

denied-,

1993); State

State
v.

v.

App.

Garrett,

Humphries,

op.

v.

1989); State v.

Verde,

849 P. 2d 578 (Utah
cit.

Further, in order to prevail in a claim that trial
counsel demonstrated a deficient performance, defendant must
overcome the strong presumption that his counsel's actions were
conscious trial strategy, and that there was a lack of any
conceivable tactical basis for his counsel's actions.
In May of 1990, Tooele County Sheriff's officers were
dispatched to an explosion and fire at "the old church" in
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Stockton, Utah.

The building was owned by the defendant herein,

Gasper Borgogno.

The building's tenant escaped, but chemicals

were found in the building that were considered a hazard to the
community, and the town was evacuated while a HazMat team cleaned
up the site and disposed of the materials.
attached hereto as Appendix
reference.)

U

(See incident reports

B" and incorporated herein by this

Stockton is a small town, with a population of

approximately 50 0, and news of the "drug lab" that was reported
to have been operated in the building's basement was a major
topic of discussion in town.

Newspaper articles on the incident

and evacuation were carried in the Tooele

Transcript,

a twice-

weekly newspaper in general circulation in Tooele County, and in
the Salt Lake City daily newspapers.

Mr. Borgogno's name was

linked with the incident, as the building's owner, and he was
associated with the lab by implication.
The extensive publicity and attendant notoriety have
made Mr. Borgogno's name known to a large proportion, if not all,
of the residents of Tooele County--the same residents making up
the pool of prospective jury members at the time of the trial in
the instant case.

Yet the only voir dire asked were the

questions, u Do any of you know the defendant . . . ?"
u

(R. 80),

(A) re you related to any of the parties by blood or marriage?"
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(R.

18), and "Do any of you bear any special relationship to the

parties, . . . ?"

(R.

82). The record shows that defense

counsel asked that the veniremen be asked about their employment.
In light of the pervasiveness of the news reports and
the defendant's subsequent involvements with law-enforcement
personnel in the Tooele area, it does not appear to appellate
counsel that Mr. Borgogno's interests were properly served by his
counsel's failure to ask for more extensive voir dire.

It is

possible that even a change of venue could have been properly
requested, given the circumstances.
This Court has held, in State
(Utah Ct. App.

v.

Vigil,

922 P.2d 15

1996), that a trial court is afforded broad

discretion during voir dire, and that this discretion "must be
exercised in favor of allowing discovery of biases or prejudice
in prospective jurors."

In Vigil,

this Court affirmed that

reversible error may occur when a conclusion can be drawn, after
reviewing the totality of the questioning, that trial counsel did
not receive an adequate opportunity to gain the information
necessary to evaluate jurors.

However, the purposes behind voir

dire (to allow trial counsel to discover any biases an individual
juror may have which would support a challenge for cause, and an
opportunity for trial counsel to gather sufficient information to
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be able to intelligently exercise a peremptory challenge) cannot
be accomplished if counsel himself fails to request that the
court ask the proper questions.

In the instant case, the trial

judge was not a resident of Tooele County and was not familiar
with its immediate local history.

It was therefore incumbent

upon defense counsel to move for the inclusion of questions that
would probe the mindset of the prospective jurors.
The recent case of Durham v.

Duchesne

County,

893 P.2d

581 (Utah 1995), presented a similar example of a situation
wherein the jury pool came from a sparsely populated, rural
county, with individuals who could be particularly concerned with
the assets of their county.

In the instant case, the jury pool

came from a sparsely populated, tightly knit, rural county, with
individuals who could be particularly concerned with the safety
of their county.

The Durham case was reversed and remanded after

the trial court denied a motion for change of venue and the jury
found no cause of action existed in the case.
In State

v.

Olsen,

869 P.2d 1004 (Utah Ct.

App.

1994), this court found that careful voir dire conducted by the
judge, followed by defense counsel's passing the jury for cause,
was sufficient caution to ensure that the defendant received a
fair trial.
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Contrary to the two actions just cited, in the instant
case the record demonstrates that defense counsel failed to
suggest any voir dire concerning pretrial publicity, despite his
client's suggestion that such questioning would be appropriate.
Thus, the defendant's right to rebut any question of bias was
denied him, by the actions of his counsel.

Since only cursory

questions were posed, the defendant has no way of knowing how he
might have been prejudiced by the failure of his counsel to
provide this form of effective assistance.

However, plain error

analysis is used in determining whether a trial court's voir dire
was adequate to rebut any question of bias in prospective jurors
(State

v.

Brooks,

868 P.2d 818 (Utah Ct.

App.

1994), and a

reading of the record makes it clear that there were no efforts
to ascertain the amount and type of knowledge those prospective
jurors had concerning the defendant and his name.

The only

question directly related to him personally was, "Do you know the
defendant?"

One may not "know" a person, yet still be aware of

his reputation in a small community.

"Knowing" does not equate

to general familiarity with the gossip concerning one's neighbor,
and a question about "knowing" a person is not likely to elicit a
response illustrative of the defendant's fame, or infamy, in a
localized area.
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In the 1994 case of Parsons

v.

Barnes,

871 P.2d 516

(Utah 1994) , Parsons argued that his counsel failed to conduct
adequate voir dire by not asking the jurors what they had heard
or read about his case.

Thus, counsel created no record from

which an appellate court could determine whether juror exposure
to the media resulted in prejudice.

In the incident case,

counsel did not even ask the jurors whether they had heard about
the case.
In the instant case, given the familiarity of the jury
pool members with the persons involved in the case, there is
reasonable probability that one or more jurors would have been
excused from service upon this jury had more extensive probing
taken place.

Had even one person pointed out to the other jurors

that Officer Niesporek's testimony corroborated that of the
defense witness, the jury's verdict could well have been
different.

However, defendant was not given the opportunity to

explore this avenue because of his counsel's failure to ask.
the very least, in this situation one's "confidence is
undermined" in the verdict.
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At

CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, this court should
reverse the verdict of the jury and remand the case to the Third
District Court with directions to dismiss the charge.

Respectfully submitted this 31st day of March, 1998.

WILLIAM B. PARSONS III
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A
POLICE REPORT PREPARED BY OFFICER
ROGER NIESPOREK, 5/28/96

CONF I DENT IAL INFORMANT
3 23 N MAIN
iOOELE. UF,
'"AY CR'MJSE
2b6 S ST!! v.T
TOOELE. UT. 332-DM 05

UP ITER:

ROGER NIESPORER

DATE:

M&v 29. 1996

963361
OH

5-23-96 I MET WITH THE ABOVE

PITY

LISTED OFFICERS AT THE TOOELE

POLICE DEPARTMENT TO CONDUCT A CONTROLLED BUY OF CONTROLLED

SUBSTANCE. I HAD BEEN ADVISED BY MY CONFIDENTIAL INFORHANT (C.l.)
I HAT HE HAD BOUGHT <>?ANH. CMETHAMPHFTAMINE) FROM BUTCH BORCOCNO IN
r;:E

PAST

AND THAI

HE

C O N T A C T E D TOOELE C O U N T Y
OET.

BELIEVED HE COULD
SHERIFF

T O H B O O .ON THIS C A S E DUE

C O U N T Y C A S E NUMBEF

?613'.-1.

7 HE P OL ICE DEPARTMENT.
NICSPOREH.
SELF.

HIS P E R S O N

A WIRE

HUNDRED

MISSPOKE}:.

SELL

TO BORCOGNO
C N THIS DATE

V.'A." SEARCHED

AND DET.
AND MY

BUY THE

TOMBOCK

THE C.I. MET W I T H U S

T'-. OET.

SELF WERE

IN

DET.

S.yAPT: FACER.

IN THE OTHER

OFFICER NIE SPORE!-

AND TGME'OCK.

*NL- I !-OL LOVED

L

-""AR.
WIRE.

-7

A N D MY

.'\: GIVEN A ONE

SUBSTANCE.

ONE CAR.

COULD RECEIVE THE T RAN i - F i 4 « i L FROM THE C.l.
STOCKTON.

AND HE

SEE

BY OFFICER

S'JARTZFACBH .

rc-NTFOLLED

WERE

WITH

IN STOC:-:TCN.

LIVING

HI'. MOTOR_R.VF > F L'AS ^.FAF.CXEP

TO

I HAD

OFFICE AND MADE A R R A N G E M E N T S

WAS THEN PLACED ON THE •_' . I .

COLLAR

yAF.'TZFAGER.

BUY SOME TODAY.

AND

PET
OFFICER

EOTH VEHICLES
WZ THEN WENT TO

PARKED BY STOCKTON P A S S .

THE C . I .

INTO STOCKTON.

.-.:• y<Z

f'UlLFD INT'" THE P.--RHING Af.EA OF BOTCHES GAl-AOE KF -All.- ft:

JOHNN" .

00 22G !
tJOKK
THE

E'0RC.!'t0NO>

RECEIVER. ( T

'."OULD TELL T H A T

*.T T H A T TIME
THEN P A R K E D
THE

RECEIVER

I

FURNED ON' THE

BV THE

FIRS

c

T -.PE_

. FATTON

W A S MO F PICKING. U P

RE'C-rDER 0?,'

IN
THE

TRAM: IT Vi-^r.

1 THEM TURNED OM HV POCKET TAPE RECORDER TO TAPE THE CONVERSATION
OVER

MY CAR

RADIO. THE C.I.

HAD MADE

CONTACT VITH BUTCH.

ADVISED THAT HE WOULD BE WITH HIM IN A MINUET.
TALK ABOUT CARS.

HE

THEY CONTINUED TO

DURIMC THE CONVERSATION I.COULD TELL THAT THERE

WAS_THREE,,TO.FOUR-PEOPLE-.TALKIMG.

THE. WIRE THEM STARTED TO

CUT

9fe33bi
HAD -::-Zl- .\ .'iWE KUMC-!Vi:r« HOtLAR E
AiJ-TL? IF I COULD BUY THAT PTU .
GILL 7 MA I THE C. T . L>? F P TO BUY

LL.

.-tit

<'.L'VI:,:L'

SHE SAFD.VSS.

• n.-. i

r.r

n.-\.;.

THIS GILL VAS THE

THE TEE NET; OF CR'ANK FROM HE.WOOD.

THE CAS-.cTTE TAPE WAS GIVEN TO PAT MARTIN TO BE TRANSCRIBED,
OF REPORT.

1

END

APPENDIX B
TOOELE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE
INCIDENT REPORT, 05/04/90

Supplemental Report:
Rpt
01

Date
/ /

Time

Offer

OFFENSE

Incident: 1 90001225

Subject

DET SGT ALAN JAMES - 05/04/90 - OFFICER DISPATCHED TO A REPORTED
EXPLOSION AT THE OLD CHURCH IN STOCKTON CITY AT APPROX. 11:57HRS
OFFICER ARRIVED AT APPROX. 00:15 HRS. AND AT THAT TIME HE
OBSERVED THAT THE RED BRICK BUILDING ON THE NORTH-WEST CORNER OF
THE INTERSECTION OF SILVER AVENUE AND JOHNSON STREET, KNOWN AS
THE OLD CHURCH HAD BEEN DAMAGED BY WHAT APPEARED TO BE AN
EXPLOSION. THE PLYWOOD COVERINGS ON THE WINDOWS WERE TORN AWAY
FROM THE BUILDING, THERE WAS SMOKE COMMING FROM THE BASEMENT OF
OF THE BUILDING, AND THE ODOR OF CHEMICALS IN THE AIR THAT
SEEMED TO BE EMINATING FROM THE BUILDING. ON THE NORTH SIDE OF
THE BUILDING I OBSERVED DEPUTY ERICKSON TALKING WITH A MALE
SUBJECT. I APPROACHED THE TWO AND OBSERVED THE MALE SUBJECT, HE
APPEARED TO BE INJURED AND I ASKED HIM IF HE HAD BEEN INJURED HE
STATED THAT HE HAD BEEN INSIDE THE BUILDING WHEN THE EXPLOSION
OCCURRED AND HAD A SLIGHT BURN TO THE LEFT SIDE OF HIS FACE, I
ASKED HIM IF HE NEEDED MEDICAL ATTENTION AND HE STATED NO, BUT
HE DID NEED TO GO BACK INTO THE BUILDING AND MAKE SURE EVERYTHIN
WAS SAFE. HE ENTERED THE BUILDING WITH DEPUTY ERICKSON AND THEN
RETURNED IN A FEW MINUTES AND INSTRUCTED ME TO TURN THE P2WER
OFF TO THE BUILDING, WHICH I DID. I THEN ASKED THE SUBJECT WHO
HE WAS AND HE STATED THAT HIS NAME WAS DAVID BERNHARD, I ASKED
HIM WHAT TYPE OF CHEMICALS HE HAD IN THE EASEMENT OF THE BUILDIN
AND HE STATE THAT THERE WERE SOME DANGEROUS ONES, AND THEN GAVE
ME SOME NAMES THAT I DID NOT UNDERSTAND. AT THAT TIME I ASKED
THE SUBJECT IF IT WAS A LAB AND HE STATED THAT IT WAS BUT WOULD
NOT SAY WHAT KIND. I THEN HANDED THE SUBJECT OVER TO SGT
MORGAN TO TRANSPORT TO THE SHERIFF'S OFFICE SO HE COULD CLEAN UP
THE SUBJECT WAS TAKEN TO THE SHERIFF'S OFFICE. I ALSO OBSERVED
A 1971 FORD VAN UTAH LISTING 8043CA PARKED EAST OF THE BUILDING
ALAN JAMES
05/04/9 0 - SGT JOE BRADSHAW ON THIS DATE I RECEIVED A CALL TO THE S.O. TO ASSIST WITH THE
QUESTIONING OF A SUBJECT WHO HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN SOME TYPE OF A
EXPLOSION AT THE OLD CHURCH IN STOCKTON. I MET WITH SGT TOM
MORGAN WHO HAD BROUGHT THE SUBJECT TO THE S.O. SUBJECTS NAME IS
DAVID D. BERNHARD OF SALT LAKE CITY, DOB 022065. AFTER SUBJECT
HAD CLEANED UP SOME WHAT HE WAS TAKEN TO THE DETECTIVE OFFICE
WHERE A TAPPED INTERVIEW WITH THE SUBJECT WAS CONDUCTED BY SGT
BRADSHAW AND MORGAN. DURING THE INTERVIEW THE SUBJECT TOLD ME
THAT HE HAD BEEN WORKING ON A FUSION PROJECT OF HIS OWN AND THAT
THE CHEMICALS THAT WERE IN THE BUILDING WERE ONLY FOR THIS TYPE
OF PROJECT. HE STATED THAT HE HAD GOTTEN THEM TO HOT AND IT HAD
CAUSED AN EXPLOSION. WHEN I ASKED SUBJECT IF HE HAD BEEN COOKING
DRUGS HE STATED NO. SUBJECT WAS ASKED IF HE KNEW WHO OWNED THE
BUILDING AND HE STATED YES, BUTCH BORGONO OF STOCKTON. SUBJECT
SAID THAT HE WAS RENTING OR LEASEING THE BUILDING, OR SOMETHING
LIKE THAT. WHEN ASKED IF HE HAD SIGNED ANY PAPERS AS TO THE RENT
HE SAID NO, HE PAID $200.00 CASH PER MONTH. I ASKED SUBJECT IF

Supplemental Report:

OFFENSE

Incident: 1 90001235

THERE WAS ANY ETHER AT THE SIT AND HE SAID THERE PROBABLY WAS.
WHEN ASKED WHAT OTHER CHEMICALS WERE THERE HE SAID HE DIDN'T
WANT TO GO INTO ALL THAT. SUBJECT WAS ASKED FOR A CONSENT TO
SEARCH WHICH HE REFUSED, BUT DID SIGN A WAIVER OF MARANDA RIGHTS
SUBJECT WAS ALSO GIVEN HIS MARANDA RIGHTS PRIOR TO THE INTERVIEW
AT THIS TIME A RAP SHEET WAS RUN ON SUBJECT AND IT WAS FOUND
THAT HE HAD BEEN ARRESTED FOR POSSESSION OF NARCOTIC EQUIPMENT,
DRUG POSSESSION AND POSSESSION OF PARAPHENRNALIA IN THE PAST AND
AT THIS TIME THE CHEMICALS POSE A THREAT TO THE COMMUNITY. AFTER
THE INTERVIEW THE SUBJECT WAS ALLOWED TO GO INTO THE HALL AND
MAKE A PHONE CALL. SHORTLY THERE AFTER SUBJECT DISAPPEARED. NC
ONE HAS SEEN SUBJECT SINCE. ALONG WITH THE REQUEST FOR A SEARCH
VJARRANT ON THE BUILDING OWNED BY BORGONO AND OCCUPIED BY SUBJECT
BERNHARD I REQUEST SEARCH WARRANT TO INCLUDE SEARCH ON GREEN
1971 FORD VAN, UTAH LICENCE # 8048CA, REGISTERED TO SUSPECT
BERNHARD
ASSIGNED TO:
REVIEWING SUPERVISOR

DATE:

TIME:
DATE :

